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Abstract: The decision of the 2016 British referendum on EU membership to take the United Kingdom out of EU will 
have significant and lasting consequences. For the United Kingdom and its relations with European neighbours, for the 
constitutional fabric of the British State, and for the EU itself at a time of rising public anxiety over the future of the 
European project. The consequences of this decision will have no greater impact however, than on the still-fragile peace 
process known as the Belfast Agreement of 1998 negotiated by parties representing the provinces’ principal cultural 
communities and the governments of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This historic event brought to an end 
decades of political violence and centuries of sectarian bitterness, or so it was thought by participants on every side. Brexit 
throws the future of that peace process into doubt.  
 
The EU was an important guarantor of that historic reconciliation, and a paradigm too for peaceful coexistence and 
‘ever-closer’ integration within a framework of multi-level governance. As such, it that offered a positive exemplar of what 
can be achieved by the setting aside of ancient quarrels. The EU has continued to play a signal role as a key agency for 
facilitating and funding projects on the ground that have consolidated the peace process and minimized inter-cultural 
conflict, gradually replacing outright animosity by rising political trust. The most signal achievement here was to reduce the 
visible ‘fact’ and symbolism of a ‘hard’ border between the two Irelands. Brexit threatens to reintroduce what had become 
an invisible and mostly insignificant border, and by doing so sending the peace process into reverse. The paper reviews how 
the imminent threat to peace in this turbulent region might be avoided, reviews competing proposals for border management, 
if a return to violence is not to be the most calamitous consequence and casualty of Brexit.   
 
 
 RESOLVING AN ANCIENT QUARREL: FROM ‘THE TROUBLES’ TO THE PEACE PROCESS 
Conflict rooted in cultural difference is a familiar feature of Irish politics. Independence achieved in 
1921 translated an ancient quarrel between nationalists and unionists loyal to the British crown into 
embittered politics in the newly created province of Northern Ireland, occasionally spilling over into 
violence.1 The principal reason was the monopoly of political and social power granted by London to the 
Protestant majority, an asymmetrical relationship that caused resentments on one side and a sense of 
entitlement and cultural exceptionalism on the other.  
Resentment by the Catholic minority at institutionalized discrimination, the monopoly of power in the 
hands of the Protestant majority gave rise in the later 1960s to a civil rights movement.2  Peaceful protests 
against institutional discrimination brought violent reaction from militants in the majority community, and 
                                                          
1 Ian McBride, Introduction: Memory and National Identity in Modern Ireland, in Ian McBride (ed), History and Memory in Modern 
Ireland (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.1-42.  
2 Niall Ó Dochartaigh, Northern Ireland since 1920, in Richard Bourke and Ian McBride (eds), The Princeton History of Modern 
Ireland. (Princeton University Press, 2016), pp. 141-67. 
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the situation quickly deteriorated into armed struggle between rival militias. The British army was 
deployed to keep the peace, and in March 1972 London suspended the regional parliament and imposed 
direct rule.3 Military involvement was no solution to this ancient quarrel, merely serving to legitimize 
insurgency, with bombs and bullets replacing the ballot box as the medium for politics.4 Three decades of 
mayhem known locally as ‘The Troubles’ spilled over the border with the Republic and occasionally 
across to the mainland, with frequent terrorist atrocities against official targets and civilians.5 Over time, 
public weariness of perpetual civil strife encouraged tentative moves for a ceasefire, resulting in the 
Belfast Agreement of 1998 that established an historic power-sharing arrangement for devolved 
government based on ‘parity of esteem’ between both warring communities.6  
Although the principal parties in the peace process were the governments in London and Dublin, both 
the EU and Washington acted as international guarantors, diplomatic interlocutors between the Northern 
Ireland parties and communities on both sides of the border.7 The 1921 border symbolized a cultural fault 
line, manifested by barbed wire, fortifications and military presence. EC / EU accession by both 
governments in 1973 had already begun to heal this division, with greater transit of goods services and 
people in both directions, facilitating cross-border collaboration on a range of social, economic and 
infrastructural projects. The peace process after 1998 exponentially increased cross-border co-operation, 
much of it financed by EC / EU structural funding.8  
                                                          
3 David McKittrick and David McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles: A History of the Northern Ireland Conflict (3rd edition 
Viking Press, London, 2012). 
4 Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, Conflict to peace: Politics and society in Northern Ireland over half a century 
(Manchester University Press, 2013). 
5 Brendan O’Leary, The Politics of Antagonism: Understanding Northern Ireland (2nd edition, Athlone Press, 1996) 
6 Cecelia Clegg, Embracing a Threatening Other: Identity and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, in Sebastian C. H. Kim, Pauline 
Kollontai and Greg Hoyland (eds), Peace and Reconciliation: In Search of Shared Identity. (Ashgate, Abingdon 2008), pp.81-93. 
7 E. Meehan, Britain’s Irish Question: Britain’s European Question?: British-Irish relations in the context of the European Union 
and the Belfast Agreement’, Review of International Studies, 26 (1) 2000, pp. 83-97. 
8 John Doyle, Governance and Citizenship in contested states: the Northern Ireland peace agreement as internationalised 
governance, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 10 1999, pp.201-219. 
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The Belfast Agreement was a step change in reconciliation and seemed finally to have ended this 
ancient quarrel, in the process making the physical border both invisible and redundant. Or so it seemed, 
until the Brexit vote. Brexit has raised many challenges for future EU / UK relations, but none of greater 
significance than the status of the Irish border, reviving anxieties all round about renewed threat to what is 
still a fragile peace in this troubled region.  
 
AN ISLAND DIVIDED: CROSS-BORDER CO-OPERATION BEFORE AND AFTER BELFAST  
Even after EC accession, Ireland both North and South experienced continuing economic fragmentation 
and cultural disconnection.9 The Single Market (1992) boosted cross-border trade, but its extent was 
modest. Both parts of Ireland continued to trade more with the United Kingdom than with each other. The 
Single Market project did increase trade and business contacts, and facilitated greater civic co-operation 
between communities, both in the North and on either side of the border through the agency of EC /EU 
programmes intended for that purpose.10 This too represented progress, yet the legacies of British 
occupation before 1921 and partition thereafter remained obstacles to deeper functional integration and 
cultural reconciliation.  
The diplomacy that culminated in the Belfast Agreement (1998) was a game changer, and one 
expedited by EU membership, its principal outcome an international treaty underwritten by the EU and 
imposing legally binding requirements on all parties to maintain peace.11 New political institutions based 
on power sharing and parity of esteem embedded a rights-based legal order, overseen by an elected 
Assembly and subsequently an executive drawn from both communities.12  However, differences in 
administrative practices between North and South meant continuing frictions over the management of 
                                                          
9 J. Bradley, The Two Economies of Ireland: An Analysis’, in M. D’Arcy and T. Dickson (eds), Border Crossings: Developing 
Ireland’s Island Economy, (Gill and MacMillan, Dublin 1995), p.40. 
10 E. Tannam, Cross-Border Co-operation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Neo-Functionalism Revisited’, 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6 (2) 2006, pp.256–276. 
11 Matthew O’Toole, Belfast Agreement constitutionally binds the UK to Europe, The Irish Times, December 18 2017. 
12 Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennin, The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as a Process, in Yaacov BarSiman-Tov 
(ed), Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation  (Oxford University Press, New York 2004), pp.11-38. 
4 
 
‘common’ EC / EU programmes, with both governments and the European Commission working 
assiduously to minimise difficulties and improve mutual trust.13 The EU’s role as a principal stakeholder in 
the peace process was confirmed for example by the INTERREG programme that established joint 
management structures and trans-border co-operation for state enterprises local government and other 
agencies. Loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the EU framework programmes, including 
Horizon, likewise promoted collaborative research and development initiatives that have signally 
contributed to economic development and cross-border infrastructure.14 Significant here was the European 
Commission’s new criteria for regional funding with the border region on both sides designated a single 
zone with ‘Objective One’ status. A positive inducement for political authorities other public business 
stakeholders and communities on either side of an increasingly meaningless border to make positive 
response to Brussels’ call for institutionalised partnership arrangements.  
Cross-border co-operation increased and on every level, economic and political, much of it within an 
EU framework. Between 1998 and 2015, for instance, intra-Irish trade virtually doubled in value to some 
€2988.3m, and in view of the present Brexit conundrum by a differential that consistently favoured trade 
from Northern Ireland to the Republic rather than vice versa.15 The Belfast Agreement was about more 
than trade, nevertheless trade flows and related economic activities in both directions confirm clear linkage 
between peace and prosperity in this troubled region, as they have elsewhere in Europe where former 
enmities are mitigated if not quite resolved by the functional dynamic of closer integration.16 Accordingly, 
the peace process lessened, even if it has not ended sectarianism. 
 
 
                                                          
13 D. Kennedy, The Northern Ireland Question and the European Union, in B. Barton and P. Roche (eds) The Northern Ireland 
Question: Perspectives and Policies (Ashgate, Aldershot 1994). 
14 M. Adshead and J. Tongue, Politics in Ireland: Convergence and Divergence on a Two Polity Island (Palgrave Macmillan 
Basingstoke 2009), pp.220-22.  
15 InterTrade Ireland, Potential Impact of WTO Tariffs on Cross-Border Trade, 2017.   
16 Frank Schimmelfennig, Liberal Theory and European Integration, in Rebekka Friedman, Kevork Oskanian 
Ramon Pacheco Pardo (eds), After Liberalism?The Future of Liberalism in International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Basingstoke 2013), pp.253-69.  
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THE EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF THE BELFAST AGREEMENT AND BEYOND 
The Belfast Agreement was always about more than domestic politics, with shared commitment to 
European values integral to the process. The accord requires signatories to take full account of common 
interests in every aspect of the agreement.17 The new institutional arrangements acknowledge the cross-
border and EU dimensions of an historic peace process. A British-Irish Council is tasked with reviewing 
EU-related matters, and an all-Ireland North-South Ministerial Council with members from the 
governments of the Republic and Northern Ireland is concerned with improving intergovernmental co-
operation.  
The EU’s framework programmes and structural funds have contributed to this remarkable 
transformation.18 By facilitating and intensifying co-operation across a range of activities: commercial / 
economic development, capital flows, business and enterprise, agriculture, tourism, and not least social 
inclusion and civic engagement.19 The EU’s ‘four freedoms’ (movement of goods, services, people and 
money), markedly increased with the onset of the Single Market, have continued to bind communities 
across a porous border.20 Free movement of persons as required by the rules of the Single Market has 
enhanced this sense of shared purpose, conferring additional citizens’ rights in a common space defined 
not merely by market making, but also socially and politically.  
The principal EU agencies for facilitating cross-border co-operation arrangements are the Support 
programme for Peace and reconciliation (SPPR), INTERREG, and Leader II programmes. Of particular 
                                                          
17 British-Irish Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of Ireland, Belfast, 10 April 1998, at para 1. 
18 B.  Laffan, The EU context of change in state and nation post- 1973’, in N. Ó Dochartaigh, K. Hayward and E. Meehan (eds) 
Dynamics of Political Change in Ireland: Making and breaking a divided Ireland (Routledge, London, 2017), pp.44-60. 
19 J. Bradley and D. Hamilton Bradley, Making Policy in Northern Ireland: A critique of Strategy 2010, Administration, 47 (3), 1999 
pp.32-50. (1999). 
20 See the comparisons cited by in E Tannam, The European Union and Business Cross-Border Co-Operation: the case of Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland’, Irish Political Studies, 11 1996, pp.103- 129  and idem Cross-Border Co-operation between 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland: Neo-Functionalism Revisited’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 
6 (2) 2006 , 256–276.  
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importance for North-South collaboration is the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) that 
expedites and monitors the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland.21 To date, 
these programmes have disbursed some 2.3 billion euros, conspicuously contributing to improved trans-
border relations at every level, from community to intergovernmental co-operation.22 The scale of this 
fiscal support has been crucial to progress, with the border region in receipt of some 3.5 billion euros under 
the current 2014-20 Multi-annual Financial Framework, notwithstanding considerable subsidies and 
structural payments from the CAP. Overall, something in the order of fully 8 percent of Northern Ireland’s 
GDP derives directly from EU funds.23  
Closer integration on the island is nowhere better illustrated than in the matter of monetary union. The 
extent to which, and notwithstanding Ireland’s membership of the Eurozone and Northern Ireland’s 
retention of sterling the border region has become a common business space, with both currencies accepted 
for transactions at every level. Co-operation not merely confined to economic matters, but with police and 
other agencies authorities on either side of an increasingly invisible border committed to maintaining 
security in what was formerly a contested political space, indeed a conflict zone.24 
 
BREXIT AND UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES 
Brexit has called this progress into question, reviving anxieties in Ireland and beyond about the inimical 
consequences of reinstating a physical border. After 1998 the border became invisible, more conduit than 
barrier between Ireland North and South and at every level. Cross-border trade expanded exponentially and 
increasing civic engagement normalized the peace process on both sides of the border.25 The border region 
became as much a shared civic and political as a merely functional space, and made easier by removing 
                                                          
21 E. Meehan, Europe and the Europeanisation of the Irish Question 1972-1998, in M. Cox, A. Guelke and F. Stephens (eds) A 
Farewell to Arms? From ‘Long War’ to Long Peace in Northern Ireland (Manchester University Press, 2000). 
22 C. Irvin and S. Byrne, Economic Aid and its role in the Peace Process, in J. Neuheiser and S. Wolff (eds) Peace at Last? The 
Impact of the Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland (Berghann, London 2002). 
23 Brexit: UK-Irish relations, European Union Committee, 6th Report of session 2016-17, House of Lords 12 December 2016, at 
p.46. 
24 P. Teague, The EU and the Irish Peace Process’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34 (4) 1996,pp. 549-70. 
25 J. Goodman, Single Europe, Single Ireland? Uneven development in process. Dublin (Irish Academic Press, 2000). 
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insignia and signage denoting national allegiance or exclusive sovereignty.26 The prospect of a reinstated 
border is concentrating minds in both communities, at government level and in Brussels about possibly 
malign consequences. 
Brexit will likely have constitutional consequences beyond Ireland, not least for the constitutional 
status of the British State and its four constituent territories. A majority of voters in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland voted in the 2016 referendum to remain in the EU. The most politically contentious issue here is 
whether or how far the ramifications of the ‘remain’ vote in two of the United Kingdom’s constituent 
polities might cause further constitutional dislocation, potentially even the disintegration of what only a 
few short decades ago was a stable and unitary state. Brendan O’Leary amongst other expert commentators 
sees the Belfast Agreement as permitting altogether more flexible constitutional arrangements between the 
constituent parts of the United Kingdom than presently exist, not least in the context of an increasingly 
devolved British polity. A degree of constitutional discretion that would permit both Northern Ireland, and 
should voters there will it Scotland too to enjoy a distinct and to a degree even a separate political status 
from the rest of the British State.27  
On this imaginative if unorthodox interpretation of Britain’s constitutional future, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland might feasibly retain EU membership, even as they remain within the British State, or they might 
do so pending the outcome of further referenda in both countries. A border poll in Northern Ireland to 
determine the province’s status vis à vis the United Kingdom and a further referendum in Scotland to 
review relations with the rest of the United Kingdom, and prospectively even to endorse outright 
independence. According to this permissive reading of the present constitutional situation, enforced exit of 
both countries from the EU solely on the grounds of a majority pro-Brexit vote in England could be 
deemed to be principled if not strictly legal grounds for these countries to choose their own constitutional 
futures. To remain within the United Kingdom, or to withdraw and with each nation determining its own 
relations with the EU. Whether any such claim to self-determination would have constitutional validity let 
                                                          
26  A. Guelke, International dimensions of the Belfast Agreement, in R. Wilford (ed.) Aspects of the Belfast Agreement (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), pp. 245-263.   
27 Brendan O’Leary, Detoxifying the UK’s exit from the EU, a multi-national compromise is possible, available online at 
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexitvote/2016/06/27/de-toxifying-the-uks-eu-exit-process-a-multi-nationalcompromise-is-possible/, 27 
June. 
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alone political credibility is quite another matter. Nevertheless, its exercise would almost certainly propel 
the United Kingdom into political crisis, provoking rebellion by insurgent elements in the smaller 
constituent nations committed to the break-up of the British.28 A far-fetched scenario maybe, but Brexit 
has brought all manner of uncertainty to Ireland, the United Kingdom, and no less so to the EU.  
Brexit threatens to end projects connecting formerly hostile border communities, thereby risking the 
peace process itself. The signatories to the Belfast Agreement never remotely considered that the United 
Kingdom and the Republic would not remain EU Member States in perpetuity. Although the Agreement 
did not explicitly refer to the status of the signatories as EU Member States, and as such does not preclude 
either government withdrawing from the European Union.29 Brexit is then a clear challenge to such 
assumptions of continuity, both in Anglo-Irish relations and for the peace process per se. The likelihood is 
that the significantly altered status of the border will have far-reaching and negative consequences for 
future relations on the island of Ireland, and at every level. A fundamental shift in political relations that 
means North-South co-operation cannot continue on present terms. Certainly not, as is likely, significantly 
different economic and regulatory arrangements apply in the respective political jurisdictions on the island 
demarcated by a reinstated border. 
 
BREXIT RISKS THE PEACE PROCESS 
All of this now called into question by Brexit.30 Current debate about the border is only in part about 
technical matters or legalistic concerns related to border management.  There is just as much uncertainty 
                                                          
28 Fintan O’Toole, United Ireland will not be based on ‘50 per cent plus one’. Brexit has made Irish unity more likely, but we need 
to reunify people first, The Irish Times, August 15 2017. 
29 A case heard in October 2016 in the Belfast High Court case ruled that there was nothing in the Good Friday Agreement to 
prevent the triggering of Article 50. In its ruling, the High Court declared that EU membership was no constitutional requirement of 
the Good Friday Agreement which would be breached by notification of Article 50. See R (Miller) and others versus the Secretary 
of State for Exiting the European Union, 29 October 2016, The UK Supreme Court upheld the Belfast High Court position in its 
ruling in January 2017, maintaining that the principle of consent for constitutional change contained in the Good Friday Agreement 
referred only to whether Northern Ireland remained in the UK or was unified with the rest of Ireland. 
30 Duncan Morrow, The Rise (and Fall?) of Reconciliation in Northern Ireland, The Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies 
44 (1) (2012), pp. 5-35. 
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about political outcomes, not least reviving sectarianism, with the prospect of a return to political violence. 
What are the likely consequences of Brexit for political stability on this troubled island? More important 
still, what are the most suitable means for avoidance of a formal or ‘hard’ border between Ireland north 
and south that will mitigate this patent threat? Three distinct but related issues merit consideration here. 
The first of these post-Brexit challenges is the generic threat to peace and political stability in Northern 
Ireland. Secondly, those matters related to functional challenges, the practicalities of managing cross-
border transactions (notably, passage of goods and persons) that are unavoidable outcomes of a reinstated 
‘hard’ border. Finally, and by no means the least of these challenges is the future state of inter-communal 
relations. In light of the historic acceptance in 1998 of parity of esteem in public administration, legal 
practice and governance, the status of equality and civil rights for every citizen, those very issues 
supposedly resolved by the peace process but now threatened by fallout from Brexit. 
These problematic issues, each one a direct consequence of Brexit, translate as five critical questions 
facing all parties to the current negotiations. The British Government which initiated Brexit, the political 
authorities and the two communities on either side of the Irish border who will be most directly affected by 
it, and the EU that has invested considerable political capital and actual ‘treasure’ in fulfilling its role as a 
principal guarantor of the peace process. 
 
(1) Political stability and the condition of inter-communal relations: Brexit has no immediate 
consequences for the status or functioning of the power-sharing institutions. However, the fact that it will 
revive political tensions and on several fronts has major implications for the peace process. Uncertainty is 
no friend of stability and anxiety over the legal status of the border, unease about future relations between 
governments in London and Dublin, between the political authorities in Stormont and Dublin and between 
local governments on both sides of the border threatens a return of febrile politics.  
Reinstating a physical border freighted with all the symbolism of statehood, whether political insignia 
or documentation checks, may revive old resentments, attracting malign attention from extremist 
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paramilitaries marginalized after 1998.31 All of this in addition to functional concerns, not least costly 
disruption to elaborate transnational supply chains that are an increasing facet of modern production and 
transnational markets. As such, boding badly for trans-border trade, and no less so for political trust 
between still divided communities. These are pressing matters for Anglo-Irish relations and for both 
communities, as they are too for current negotiations between London and Brussels over the terms of 
Britain’s EU withdrawal. On the British side, there is rather more wishful thinking than clear-sighted 
realism. The official letter from the Prime Minister to the European Council formally triggering Article 50, 
acknowledged the ‘‘important responsibility to make sure that nothing is done to jeopardise the peace 
process in Northern Ireland, and (the commitment) to continue to uphold the Belfast Agreement’’. The 
official government position paper on Northern Ireland and Ireland, likewise confirmed the Belfast 
Agreement as ‘the bedrock of the peace process’, and that ‘‘nothing agreed as part of the United 
Kingdom’s exit in any way undermines the Agreement’’.32 Noble intentions but followed by diplomacy 
that focused on Britain’s preoccupation with securing favourable trade terms post-Brexit, with the border 
issue almost an afterthought, relegated some down London’s list of priorities.33  
The EU negotiators too have prioritised their own interests, not least securing Britain’s financial 
obligations under the EU Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2, and ensuring continuing rights for EU 
citizens’ resident in the United Kingdom. The border issue became a priority only latterly when these more 
pressing issues were resolved, and even then only tangentially in response to nebulous British proposals 
for future UK-EU trade relations. The European Parliament has given the issue rather more attention, with 
representatives of the border communities lobbying hard to ensure the achievements of the peace process 
are not sacrificed to political expediency. In a resolution of 3rd October 2017, the Parliament affirmed that, 
‘‘the unique position and special circumstances confronting the island of Ireland must be addressed in the 
withdrawal agreement and this in a manner fully consistent with the Good Friday Agreement in all its 
                                                          
31 Brian Walker, The Irish government is pursuing Northern Ireland’s interests more actively than the UK government, The 
Constitution Unit, UCL May 23 2017 available online at https://constitution-unit.com/2017/05/23/the-irish-government-is-pursuing-
northern-irelands-interests-more-actively-than-the-uk government/. 
32 Northern Ireland and Ireland. Position Paper, HMG 16 August 2017,pp. 1-6. 
33 Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50, London, 29 March 2017, available online at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prime-ministersletter-to-donald-tusk-triggering-article-50.  
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parts…. in order to ensure the continuity and stability of the Northern Ireland peace process.’’34 These 
assurances have risen up the EU’s agenda, making meaningful British proposals for managing the border a 
likely deal-breaker.  
 
(2) Practicalities of border management: Brexit will disrupt border arrangements on the functional as 
well as the political level. Reversion to separate economic, and in some instances legal orders in Ireland 
will require reinstatement of formal procedures at the border, in conformity with WTO rules. The critical 
issue here is how ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ a border will follow from the negotiations. In an increasingly 
interdependent globalizing economy, production is transnational as much as merely local or national 
activity. Products at various stages of manufacture transit between Member States, and sometimes more 
than once in what are complex production processes and elaborate supply chains. The rules governing the 
Single European Market are designed to ensure ease and speed of passage across borders. Britain’s exit 
from the SEM and the customs union will severely hinder these arrangements.  
A principal issue for both sides in the negotiations is how to meet the challenge of exponential 
economic interdependence, and no less important limit the impact of imminent reversal of functional 
integration on what is still a brittle peace. Formal border arrangements will re-politicize the border, as well 
as hindering transit of goods and people, impeding commerce and disrupting trans-border supply chains, 
ratcheting business costs, and inhibiting free movement of labour in either direction. This latter outcome is 
especially disruptive given that many thousands of citizens live in one part of Ireland yet work, study or do 
business in the other. 
One solution proposed by officials in Brussels and Dublin is to relocate customs and other procedural 
checks away from historic crossing points, for instance by establishing customs’ clearing stations that 
avoid politically sensitive crossing points. How feasible is it, the encumbrances of history notwithstanding, 
to relocate the Irish border if only for administrative convenience? Arrangements already exist, notably 
between the United Kingdom and France under the terms of the 2003 Le Touquet Treaty for repositioning 
                                                          
34 European Parliament, State of play of negotiations with the United Kingdom, P8_TA-PROV(2017)0361, 3 October 2017, 
available online at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8- TA-2017-
0361+0+DOC+PDF+V0//. 
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Britain’s ‘border’.35 This protocol was a response to particular circumstances, whereby Britain had become 
a destination of choice for thousands of non-EU migrants, many without legal status or entitlement to 
reside in Britain. Accordingly, Eurostar rail (and seagoing passengers at the Channel ports) technically 
‘depart’ from the United Kingdom and ‘enter’ France (and Belgium) when they cross the British border at 
Eurostar’s London terminus, and for incoming passengers cross the United Kingdom border at termini in 
Paris and Brussels respectively, and at the Channel ports on the Continental side.  
There is no technical reason that prevents similar arrangements at the Anglo-Irish border, relocating 
requisite administrative checks to the port of Liverpool, or indeed any other British and Irish airport or 
ferry terminal. Not technical barriers as such, but certainly political objections in view of the visceral 
symbolism of the present British border with the Republic for militant unionists in Ulster, and for nativists 
in the governing Conservative Party who see control of the border as emblematic of inalienable 
sovereignty. For many Northern Irish unionists the 1921 border remains a potent symbol of their British 
allegiance, more than merely an administrative demarcation but an incontrovertible political fact. One 
invested with existential meaning about identity, the sort of nativist sentiment that rallied behind Brexit 
during the referendum campaign.  
Common sense and practical solutions can only go so far, make no convincing response to the 
primordial instincts that mobilises identity politics. Most especially in Ireland, where historical memory 
transcends ‘mere’ reason, retains potency as the primary and for many remains the primal determinant of 
political attachment and belonging. The prospective threat to ease of transit across what is presently a 
merely notional border presents a real challenge to British negotiators whose determination to recover 
control of their own borders has given political oxygen to unionists in Northern Ireland and Tory 
ideologues at Westminster alike. Accordingly, it precludes any ‘solution’ to the border issue likely to be 
acceptable to the EU, Irish nationalists, and most especially to the Irish government.  
 
                                                          
35 Treaty between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the French 
Republic concerning the Implementation of Frontier Controls at the Sea Ports of both Countries on the Channel and North Sea Le 
Touquet, 4 February 2003, HMG Command Paper 6172. 
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(3) Disruption of cross border regimes: Many aspects of public sector activity and private commerce 
alike are administered on an all-Ireland basis, materially assisted by the Special EU Programmes Body 
(SEUPB) that manages the PEACE and INTERREG programmes.36 Programmes that have considerably 
strengthened cross-border contacts, delivering the peace process on the ground as practical citizen-based as 
much as top-down elitist projects. Co-operation in both public sector projects and business ventures 
intended to reinforce cross-border and inter-communal integration are the functional ballast of the peace 
process. Notable here are improvement of transportation and communication links that increase physical 
contacts, rules on food safety, coastal lights and navigation of internal waterways that traverse the Irish 
border, and cultural exchanges and civic engagement between formerly disconnected and ideologically 
estranged communities. 
These programmes and others will be hindered or cease altogether in Northern Ireland post-Brexit, and 
notwithstanding the British Government’s confirmation that community programmes will continue, for 
instance by guaranteeing funding to the current EU Peace IV and INTERREG programme up to 2020, the 
future of cross-border initiatives essential for sustaining the peace process at ground level remain in doubt. 
The same might be said about common regulatory arrangements that embody the classic functionalist 
paradigm of European integration: inter alia the integrated energy market for the generation and supply of 
electricity and mutual sanitary-phytosanitary arrangements for monitoring animal health, the latter critical 
for the agricultural and especially for the dairy industry crucial for the economy of the border region.37 The 
prospects for regulatory divergence post-Brexit, in these and other aspects of administrative and 
commercial integration will in some degree diminish present regulatory approximation in goods, as well 
undermining common arrangements for consumer protection and health and safety. 
Another negative externality from reinstating a formal border will be discontinuance of public 
procurement contracts. Agencies on either side of the notional border have become used to pooling public 
resources, developing common programmes and other shared endeavors for delivering economies of scale 
                                                          
36 B. Laffan and D. Payne, The EU in the Domestic: Interreg III and the Good Friday Institutions, Irish Political Studies, 17.1, 2002, 
pp. 74-96. 
37 See https://www.daera-ni.gov.uk/articles/cattle-imports-gb UK Withdrawal (‘Brexit’) and the Good Friday Agreement.  
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in service provision, notably in public health, social services and education. All of that activity and 
interdependence now certain to be disrupted or even discontinued.  
 
(4) Free movement of people: A Common Travel Area (CTA) exists between the United Kingdom 
and the Republic without any requirement for immigration controls. This arrangement is not a direct 
consequence of EU accession, and neither does its legitimacy depend on the EU legal order, although it 
does reinforce the EU’s requirement of free movement. The CTA is a legacy, indeed an affirmation of 
close albeit ambivalent historical links and cultural ties between the two states following their formal 
separation.38 The Republic was a constituent part of the British State until Home Rule in 1921 and 
thereafter a Dominion of the British Empire, until unilaterally proclaiming its sovereign independence in 
1937. Irish citizens have nevertheless enjoyed special status in the United Kingdom, including the right to 
reside, access to certain social benefits, and even to exercise the franchise in British general elections.39 
These unique arrangements do not derive as such from EU membership but they are confirmed in 
protocols appended to the EU treaties. Most especially in Article 2 of Protocol No.20 of the Lisbon Treaty, 
which confirms that both countries, ‘‘may continue to make arrangements between themselves relating to 
the movement of persons between their territories’’.40 
Brexit is both a political and juridical challenge to these novel arrangements, as it is for other aspects of 
this special post-imperial relationship. Freedom of movement between these islands post-Brexit raises the 
important issue of how to distinguish between categories of citizens, whether Irish or British citizens, and 
those of other EU countries. Neither country is signatory to the Schengen Agreement and both exercise 
border controls on arrivals from elsewhere in the EU. The British ‘solution’ to this conundrum, as with so 
many other Brexit-related technicalities is to simply affirm a ‘determination’ to avoid a rigid system of 
passport controls at the Irish border, to maintain visa free access to the EU by its citizens and vice versa.  
                                                          
38 See the evidence from Professor Bernard Ryan to House of Lords European Union Committee (2016) ‘Brexit: UK Irish relations’, 
House of Lords Paper 76, pp.32-33. 
39 UK Government, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, CM 9417, 2 February 2017. 
40 At https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN, p.293. 
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However, the reality of ingress and egress across a reinstated and indeed a politically controversial 
border will present difficulties for citizens of the Republic, even if they do retain the privileges conferred 
by the Common Travel Area. More problematic still, is the incentive of a less restrictive border between 
EU and UK domains than the present EU-UK border at Calais and elsewhere for non-EU citizens intent on 
reaching the United Kingdom. Depending on the final withdrawal arrangements, former EU partners 
(notably France and Belgium) might have less incentive to police their own borders on behalf of the United 
Kingdom than they presently do. 
There is no agreement yet on an issue critical for the sovereignty imperative of those who campaigned 
and voted for Brexit, for whom controlling immigration was a principal motivation. To resolve this issue 
will require more than merely bland assurances or reassuring words from politicians. A rigorous border 
regime for deterring illicit entry to the United Kingdom via the geographically porous Irish border can only 
mean the reinstatement of the ‘hard’ border that London disclaims. This is the very crux of the border 
conundrum: avoidance of a ‘hard’ border realistically means remaining at the very least within the customs 
union. Yet to do so, will contravene the pledge of arch-Brexiteers to recover national sovereignty.  
The dilemma facing the British Government is then the wholly discrepant one of both delivering 
uncompromising Brexit, whilst avoiding what objective observers regard as the unavoidable reality of 
making unpalatable compromises in order to make a future trade deal with the EU.41 One can quite see 
why. Some thirty thousand people on both sides of the border live in one part of Ireland whilst working or 
studying in the other. To say nothing of managing cross border traffic flows that have grown exponentially 
since 1998, a complex web of social, commercial and civic activities for which rigorous border checks will 
be severe impediment, imposing additional costs on business, placing further strain on official agencies 
mandated to implement them, and not least ratchetting political tensions.42  
 
(5) Assurance of civil rights and equality: Rights equivalence is the normative fundament of the 
Belfast Agreement, the sine qua non of the peace process. A legal denominator of communal reconciliation 
                                                          
41 HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union’ London: HMSO, CM9417.  
42 House of Lords European Union Committee (2016) Brexit: UK-Irish relations, House of Lords Paper 76, p.18.   
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and shared civic purposes enshrined in EU law, providing assurance to citizens against unwonted 
discrimination regardless of cultural origin or religious affiliation. A particular concern about these 
arrangements post-Brexit is how far rights affirmed in the Belfast Agreement and deriving from EU 
membership will be impaired or even curtailed.43 That Agreement gave assurance of equivalence in the 
standard of rights protection, both in the Republic and in Northern Ireland, a principal gauge of ‘parity of 
esteem’ as between the unionist and nationalist communities in the North.  
Whether or how far British withdrawal from the EU’s supranational legal code might devalue or 
otherwise diminish these legal guarantees to the citizens of Northern Ireland remains a source of anxiety, 
even as the United Kingdom remains, for the time being at least, adherent to the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Fundamental rights are elemental to the peace process. The question of trammelling such 
rights is also a matter of concern, for all citizens of the United Kingdom and not merely those in Northern 
Ireland, although this a broader constitutional matter and properly the subject for separate consideration.44 
For the minority community in the North, long time victims of civil rights abuses that gave rise to 
insurgent politics, Brexit is an uncomfortable reminder of decades of official and informal discrimination.  
A fact acknowledged by the government in Dublin and the Brussels institutions alike, indeed by anyone 
concerned to protect fundamental rights as the fundament of liberal and democratic politics that is essential 
to the peace process.45 To remove the EU as a principal interlocutor of the peace process while not in itself 
implying a downgrading of fundamental rights in Northern Ireland. Though to do so will undoubtedly 
undermine brittle trust across the communal divide, weaken the institutional mainstay of a rights-based 
order in a polity where prior to 1998 rights were frequently compromised or merely arbitrary.   
A related concern is the prospect (widely anticipated) of British withdrawal from the ECHR, another 
indicator of the United Kingdom’s present isolationist mind-set. A late signatory to the Convention after 
the Blair Government incorporated it into British law it was never entirely acceptable to many in the 
                                                          
43 C. McCrudden, The Good Friday Agreement, Brexit and Rights (British Academy London and Royal Irish Academy Dublin 
2017), at p.16.  
44 See Vernon Bogdanor, Brexit And Our Unprotected Constitution, The Constitution Society, 2018.  
45 European Commission, Guiding principles for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Brussels, 20 September 2017, at p. 4. 
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Conservative Party who regard it as a constraint on judicial sovereignty. Exiting the Convention remains a 
distinct possibility, although to do so would further weaken what is a fundamental underpinning of the 
Belfast Agreement, and signify erosion of London’s commitment to the transnational legal order and the 
demise of an important safeguard for minority rights in Northern Ireland. A risk widely acknowledged by 
EU authorities and institutions although rather less so by Westminster politicians intent on ‘taking back 
control’ of British laws. The familiar assertion by those who regard a sovereign Parliament as the surest, 
indeed from this nativist standpoint the only guarantor of fundamental rights is hardly convincing, bearing 
in mind the precept adduced by the eminent English jurist William Blackstone, that what Parliament has 
done any successive parliament may just as readily undo.46  
A final consideration here is the likely consequence of Brexit for the singular arrangement that is 
citizenship in Northern Ireland. The unique status that predates British and Irish EU accession is the right 
of anyone born on the island of Ireland to hold Irish citizenship without relinquishing British nationality. 
There is no reason why Brexit should alter this status, unless either government determines otherwise: the 
Irish government withdrawing the right to duality, or London prohibiting it for its own citizens in Northern 
Ireland. As things currently stand, both are unlikely occurrences. Exercising their right to EU citizenship 
post-Brexit is however altogether more problematic. National citizenship is the legal requirement for 
acquiring the status and rights of European citizenship. Citizens in the province who opt for singular 
British nationality will automatically lose those rights, unless they opt for dual nationality.47  
This may be accounted no great loss for those nativists who see ‘Europe’ as entirely ‘other’ and EU 
citizenship as essentially meaningless. Yet for some citizens, especially amongst the young, multi-layered 
arrangements for political belonging confirm new opportunities for expressing a nuanced political and 
cultural identity. A mirror to the emerging and multi-faceted socio-cultural reality that is contemporary 
cultural attachment, what some scholars describe as post-national citizenship.48 Arrangements that confer a 
degree of choice about cosmopolitan or multiple identity, altogether novel ways of manifesting ontological 
                                                          
46 Commentaries, Volume 1 (1765 edition), at pp. 160-162. 
47 Brian Ó Caoindealbháin, Citizenship and borders: Irish nationality law and Northern Ireland, IBIS working paper no. 68, Working 
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48 G. Delanty, Habermas and post‐ national identity: Theoretical perspectives on the conflict in Northern Ireland, Irish Political 
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ideas about ‘self’ and prospects for transnational attachments and plural identities that in the case of 
Ireland Brexit now threatens to foreclose.   
 
PROSPECTIVE ‘SOLUTIONS’? 
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that the prospect of Brexit has serious implications for the 
peace process in Ireland. The Brexit negotiations have raised prospective ‘solutions’ for addressing the 
problems outlined above, by no means all of them offering convincing answers or appropriate solutions. 
How then should we evaluate the feasibility of various options proposed by the respective parties for 
resolving the border question? 
 
(i) Moving the border: The most controversial ‘solution’ for avoiding a ‘hard border’ in Ireland and 
endorsed by EU27 negotiators, some Irish politicians and British business interests is to relocate the 
‘border’ to the middle of the Irish Sea. The United Kingdom, or rather more contentiously Northern 
Ireland alone of the constituent parts of the British State, would remain in the customs union and / or the 
Single Market.49 This argument is predicated on pragmatism, the practical advantages of Northern Ireland 
remaining in the present customs and / or SEM arrangements. A proposal disavowed by staunch 
Brexiteers, not least Northern Ireland’s unionists who see this proposal merely as cover for malign 
intentions by Dublin and its EU allies to bring about a united Ireland. A ‘plot’ intended to break the 
political ties, loosen the cultural bonds, and sever constitutional links between the province and the United 
Kingdom. Wholly unacceptable to unionists, whether in Northern Ireland and the mainland committed to 
maintaining the constitutional fabric of the British State. Unionists who utterly disbelieve Dublin’s 
assurances that its intention here is not ‘‘a land grab’’ but merely avoidance of a formal border.50  
To this end, EU negotiators have proposed what is described as a ‘back-stop’ arrangement: avoidance 
of formal customs and regulatory controls at the UK-Irish but not the EU-UK border, with closer 
                                                          
49 C. Gallagher and K. Report on How Designated Special Status for Northern Ireland Within the EU can be Delivered Doughty 
Street Chambers, London) Policy Department for Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 2017.. 
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regulatory alignment across the Irish border, thereby avoiding the paraphernalia of a formal border. 
Accordingly, Northern Ireland would continue to conform to EU technical standards and other regulatory 
requirements, remain within the Common External Tariff, and continue to abide by EU customs rules and 
duties. At least until a bespoke British customs arrangement obviates the need for entirely separate 
customs and other regulatory arrangements for Northern Ireland.  
This outcome would permit free movement of goods, services and people across the border. 
Arrangements that since 1973 have contributed much to cross-border integration facilitated civic co-
operation and functional interdependence between border communities on both sides. In the process, 
ensuring mutual access by stakeholders and communities on either side to EU structural funds and 
framework programmes indispensable for maintaining peace through managed prosperity. A logical 
‘solution’ certainly, but one altogether easier to prescribe than to deliver, precisely because it puts common 
sense and functional logics before visceral emotion and prioritizes economic rationality over raw politics, 
both unlikely outcomes on this island where politics is shaped more by visceral sentiment than by pure 
reason.  
Described as a ‘backstop’ arrangement and appended by EU negotiators in response to insistent 
lobbying by Dublin to the agreement to extend the United Kingdom’s withdrawal period, the Commission 
gave the proposal legal form as a draft protocol. As one commentator sees it, ‘‘if (this ‘backstop’ 
arrangement) came into effect, this would inevitably entail checks on goods arriving from the rest of 
Britain into Northern Ireland, erecting a border within the United Kingdom. Thus, many in the UK, from 
across the political spectrum, view the proposal as an implicit attack on the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional order. Theresa May said that ‘no prime minister could ever agree’ to it’’.51 So it has proved, 
with the British Government reformulating the backstop on terms altogether more conducive to its own 
narrow interests than to those of Ireland, let alone to ensuring the integrity of the peace process.  
 
(ii) Median solutions, differential arrangements: Anxiety about the future of the peace process is the 
critical factor in proposals for ensuring an invisible Irish border, or it is for the Dublin authorities, and on 
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their insistence negotiators in Brussels. In this narrative Northern Ireland’s turbulent past, the fragility of 
the peace process requires every effort to avoid complete rupture between Ireland North and South. 
Moderate unionists and some Brexiteers accept the case for continuity, so long as this avoids 
compromising the province’s constitutional status as a constituent part of the United Kingdom. One 
proposal particularly amenable both to Dublin and Brussels is Northern Ireland’s continued ‘association’ 
with the Single Market through membership of the European Economic Area.52  
This median solution would permit unhindered movement of goods, services, capital and people, as 
well as giving businesses in Northern Ireland continuing access to public procurement opportunities 
throughout the EU, and especially in the Republic their principal market for this type of trade. Moreover, it 
would guarantee Northern Ireland’s continuing participation in EU programmes and activities: inter alia 
the Erasmus programme, cross-border co-operation on environmental matters, accessing EU financial and 
programmatic support for initiatives in tourism, public health, and not least police and judicial co-
operation, including participation in the European Arrest Warrant scheme and continued access to EU 
data-bases on criminal intelligence. The principal objection here from the British side is that any such 
arrangement confutes the very idea of the United Kingdom’s status as a singular and sovereign 
constitutional entity. 
The British Government has responded to the particular challenge of the Irish border with its own 
median arrangements. Firstly, a bespoke ‘customs arrangement’ to apply not only at the Northern Ireland 
border as in the EU backstop but to EU-UK customs arrangements per se, and ‘‘in a way that removes the 
need for a UK-EU customs border’’.53 Described as ‘a new customs partnership’ this is the preferred 
option of the Prime Minister and those in her Cabinet who prefer to stay as closely aligned after Brexit to 
the EU’s customs union as possible. As such, the United Kingdom would leave the customs union, 
replacing it with altogether looser arrangement that, while permitting continuing access to lucrative EU 
markets would avoid compliance with the full complement of common legal obligations and ECJ 
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jurisdiction required of EU Member States, notably on free movement, thereby avoiding compromising 
autonomy in trade policy.  
The motivation here is less about assuaging anxieties in Ireland than it is insuring British businesses 
against a ‘cliff-edge’ Brexit, falling out of the EU without agreed customs arrangements in place.54 
Predictably, the Europeans have responded by dismissing this proposal as merely an attempt to ‘cherry 
pick’ the advantages of continuing access to the common market without assuming any of the obligations 
of full membership. Or to use another comestible metaphor, an attempt to have ‘cake and eat it’! Brexiteers 
in the Cabinet and on the parliamentary backbenches likewise object to this median solution but on 
antithetical grounds, that it is merely an insidious ploy by ‘remainers’ to defer Brexit, or even to avoid it 
altogether.  
A key aspect of this and other median solutions is a calculated avoidance of stark choices and clear-cut 
outcomes, preferring nuance to exactness as the best, indeed the only means for squaring the circle that is 
Brexit. Meanwhile, assurances from the British Government, that in the event of failure to agree a mutual 
and comprehensive free trade deal between the EU and the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland would have 
the right to decide whether to follow United Kingdom or EU rules in the case of future divergence, merely 
adds to confusion in an already convoluted situation. A customs partnership in some form would require 
the United Kingdom to replicate EU rules on imports from the rest of the world where their final 
destination is the EU, with the UK customs service collecting duties at its borders on behalf of the EU. 
Some members of the British Government, including Prime Minister May, see this as a convenient way of 
aligning with the EU without being part of its institutional order. Whereas Brexiteers repudiate this 
‘solution’ for its complexity, but principally on grounds that the United Kingdom would remain subject to 
the EU’s legal jurisdiction, a ‘rule taker’ but not a ‘rule maker’, and with its sovereign right to trade on its 
own terms with third parties utterly compromised. An arrangement one leading Brexiteer has described as 
being that of a ‘vassal state’.55  
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Any even interim arrangement that temporarily postpones Brexit-day seems to its most zealot advocates 
to invalidate the referendum pledge to ‘take back control’ of the British border, and with that to fully 
recover national competence over immigration and trade policy. These objectives were the principal 
drivers of the Brexit campaign, and subsequently the leitmotif of the official British approach in the 
negotiations. In the meantime and in response to what it sees as EU intransigence, lack of progress on a 
satisfactory customs arrangement and with time fast running out, the British Government has proposed its 
own interim or ‘backstop’ arrangement for continuing customs and regulatory alignment with the EU. A 
proposal to apply to the EU-UK border per se and not only in Ireland that would avoid reinstating a hard 
border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom, but above all to prevent the United 
Kingdom exiting without any customs arrangements in place. A ‘solution’ that raises another critical 
problem for hard-line Brexiteers, who see it less as insurance against economic disaster than as retreat, 
indeed as outright defeat. In effect, Brexit in name only, exiting the EU institutions but not escaping their 
jurisdiction or their rules, and as such outright denial of the express ‘will of the people’ as expressed in the 
referendum.56 As they see it, any such outcome is nothing less than mendacity by Britain’s liberal 
internationalist establishment opposed to the ‘real’ national interest.  
At the time of writing, each of these median solutions for border management remains in play, but 
neither has found consensus in the British Cabinet, and certainly not between Dublin or Brussels, 
peremptorily dismissed by chief EU negotiator Michel Barnier as merely ‘‘magical thinking’’.57Brussels 
has rejected both the proposal for a customs ‘partnership’ and a bespoke British backstop, the latter on 
grounds that it does not entail regulatory standards for goods, thereby precluding a soft border; but 
primarily because it prioritizes British economic interests over the survival of the peace process.  
 
(iii) Technological ‘solutions’: A less politically contentious although no less problematic ‘solution’ to 
border management is the so-called technology ‘fix’, which HMG proposed in its official position paper on 
future customs arrangements. One of two distinct though hardly incompatible proposals for avoiding a 
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‘hard’ Irish border, the first of these a customs ‘arrangement’ (whether a permanent or temporary 
backstop) discussed above. Both proposals intended to avert complete rupture in the smooth transit of 
goods between the United Kingdom and the EU, by reducing time-consuming paperwork and procedural 
checks at the actual border, wherever located. This objective is linked to complementary proposals for a 
supposedly ‘‘highly streamlined customs arrangement’’ described in official jargon as ‘maximum 
facilitation’ (max-fac). Digital monitoring designed to ‘‘continue some of the existing (border) 
arrangements between the UK and the EU; put(ting) in place new negotiated and potentially unilateral 
facilitations to reduce and remove barriers to trade; and implement technology-based solutions to make it 
easier to comply with customs procedures’’. To do so by employing smart technology, and in the case of 
the Irish border with special ‘exemptions’ from the customs checks for small businesses, and all 
supposedly facilitated by mutual ‘goodwill’ in order to minimise formal procedures and unnecessary red-
tape.  
A mix of reciprocity, technology and, ‘‘utilising the UK’s existing tried and trusted third country 
processes for UK-EU trade, building on EU and international precedents, and developing new innovative 
facilitations to deliver as frictionless a customs border as possible.’’58  The technology ‘solution’ is 
frequently cited by British politicians as appropriate means for the avoidance of formalised customs 
arrangements that, as they see it, would require formal legal and rule-taking obligations with the EU legal 
order. That said, advocates of the technology fix offer little convincing evidence that digital monitoring of 
cross-border traffic can adequately address the immensely complicated logistical, and no less so the 
political challenges of the Irish border.  
Technology is in use elsewhere for facilitating rapid transit of goods and people across international 
borders, for example: biometric passport checks at airports, electronic scanning of vehicle registrations or 
cargo declarations and advance electronic transmission of customs manifests to avoid delays. British 
politicians have particularly cited light-touch transit procedures at the Norway-Sweden border. Experts 
such as Eurotunnel’s director of public affairs and the CEO of HMRC, the latter giving evidence before the 
House of Commons Treasury Committee remain distinctly underwhelmed by the technology solution, on 
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grounds of procedural oversimplification and the cost of installing smart technology.59 Moreover, the very 
scale of traffic flows at the UK-EU border (whether in Ireland or at the Channel ports) is altogether greater 
than at the Scandinavian border, and with delays in transit unavoidable even there.  
The principal issue at the Irish border however is less the matter of volume or cost than quotidian 
politics. Traffic flows either way across that northern border are politically less problematic: in part, 
because Norway, as a member of the European Economic Area, is fully participant in the Single Market. 
The critical issue for Ireland however is residual history. It is doubtful whether merely technical or 
procedural solutions can manage a border defined by factious history and complicated geography, with 
innumerable official and many unofficial crossing points. Difficulties further complicated by the 
administrative challenge of monitoring mixed cargoes, and subject to multiple technical standards and 
product regulations.  
 
(iv) ‘Regulatory alignment’ and ‘standards equivalence’: Wishful thinking about a bespoke 
outcome is apparent too in another contrived British ‘solution’ to the border predicament. A proposal that 
complements the Government’s second-best ‘solution’ to the border issue, rather glibly described above as 
‘maximum facilitation’. Pragmatism is a familiar reflex of British political culture, although on occasions 
sometimes merely cover for hubris: a convenient mix of virtuous ‘exceptionalism’ and administrative 
inventiveness wrapped in complacent national self-regard. In this particular instance a familiar British 
meme that conveniently juxtaposes native resourcefulness with the European dogmatism and 
bureaucratisation.60 
The intention here is to maintain as much complementarity as possible post-Brexit between British and 
EU regulatory norms and technical standards, in order to preclude the need for elaborate regulatory checks 
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and customs procedures at the border. A scaled down variant of this proposes that only selective UK-EU 
regulatory alignment and complementarity be applied to those products, procedures or services deemed to 
be essential for cross-border trade between the Republic and the North, notably though not exclusively in 
sanitary and phytosanitary regimes, rules on food safety and animal and plant health standards.  
On the purely pragmatic level, common sense confirms, even commends this approach. After all, at the 
very moment of Britain’s withdrawal from the Union complete regulatory alignment will exist, and on 
every level between the United Kingdom and EU27, the legacy of the UK’s assimilation of the Community 
acquis over its forty-six years of membership. As part of its intention to maintain close trading relations 
with the EU regulatory proximity has featured and prominently in the British Government’s strategic 
response to Brexit. The principal vehicle here has been the transposing of much of the present acquis 
directly into British statute law. At the point of the United Kingdom’s departure, quite separate yet parallel 
legal orders and regulatory regimes will exist, transferred at least for the time being into British law as a 
singular and complementary regulatory order, albeit framed as singularly national and no longer as EU 
law. The pitfalls of this ‘solution’ are both political and temporal. Certainly complementary legal and 
proximate regulatory orders at the point of departure: but following the logics of Brexit to cultivate global 
rather than merely regional trade, concurrent for how much longer? 
Future UK / EU regulatory relations are bound to diverge over time, shrinking their present normative 
‘fit’. This after all is perhaps the present government’s principal aspiration for Brexit The bilateral trade 
deals it anticipates negotiating with prospective global trade partners will more likely than not be positive-
sum bargains, and as such likely to require greater concessions from the party with least leverage. The side 
with the greatest economic heft in any bi-lateral trade bargain will always impose more of its own 
preferences, not least its regulatory standards as a requirement for signing off on the deal. The logics of the 
United Kingdom’s future engagement with the world’s economic super-powers, from China to the USA 
and beyond suggest that the demandeur in these bargains will more often than not be Britain. What will the 
prospects be then for continuing regulatory alignment with the EU, and more to the point here, between 
erstwhile partners on either side of the border in Ireland?  
As an afterthought and with the Brexit deadline drawing rapidly closer Britain’s chief negotiator, David 
Davies, proposed along similar lines perhaps the most bizarre of ‘solutions’ to the border conundrum to 
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date. A ten-mile wide ‘special economic zone’ along the entire 310-mile border, with a ‘double hatted’ 
customs arrangement (described by some Government insiders as ‘max fac 2’) similar to that operating in 
Liechtenstein, that would permit businesses to operate simultaneously in accordance with UK and EU 
rules.61 This proposal was widely derided, but is indicative of the logics of British proposals on the border 
issue thus far: intended less as a long term let alone a workable solution than as short-term stratagem, 
evidence of London’s desperation to move things forward on the negotiations. The proposals by the British 
side for resolving the border issue are less a reflection of principled concern, than an attempt to assuage the 
‘markets’, reassure a nervous domestic public, persuade Brussels to agree to a bespoke trade deal, and 
thereby outflank British ‘remainers’. To convince critics at home and abroad that smooth transition from 
EU membership is feasible, outright chaos of the ‘doomsday’ scenario avoidable by equipping the United 
Kingdom with a comprehensive regulatory order and custom’s arrangement.  
The British Government’s transposition of the entire acquis into domestic law is less a gesture of 
accommodation, let alone cultural respect for of the EU regime, but an entirely functional response to the 
fundamental challenges of Brexit. On the one hand, the imperative to decouple from the EU regulatory 
order and as soon as possible, recovering what its tribunes proclaim as the ‘prize’ of national sovereignty; 
and on the other, to retain as many benefits accruing from EU membership as possible, whilst minimizing 
the legal obligations that accompany them without wrecking the British economy.  
What is patent from the negotiations to date is that the British Government will have to decide and soon 
which of these by no means co-ordinate ‘solutions’ reviewed above will be its settled position on the 
border issue, and linked to that its preferred outcome for trade relations with erstwhile EU partners. 
Otherwise time will eventually run out, the United Kingdom crashing out of the Union without  preparing 
businesses, consumers and the population at large for the immense challenges facing post-Brexit Britain.  
 
POST SCRIPTUM: ANSWERING ANOTHER IRISH QUESTION? 
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This overview of the challenges raised by Brexit for the management, and not least the security of the 
only EU-UK land border shows that difficulties are more apparent than practical solutions. The proposals 
reviewed above for resolving the border conundrum are each dependent on willingness to compromise, on 
forbearance by protagonists with quite different preferences, a quality that is in short supply both in the 
official British approach to European integration, and even more so in Ireland’s fractious politics.  
None of these prospective solutions has so far proved acceptable to the respective parties in these 
negotiations. Moreover, none has proved capable of healing the deep ideological rift in the governing 
Conservative party. A party whose factions at every level nevertheless remain formally committed to the 
principles enshrined in the Belfast Agreement, or so they claim. The same can be said about the 
protagonists in Ireland who continue to view the objective of a ‘mutually satisfactory’ solution to the 
border question through lenses that reflect quite different histories, distinct and contending political 
preferences and clashing cultural identities, competing ideas of national and communal interests.  
In the end, and notwithstanding two decades of peaceful coexistence and constructive engagement, 
facilitated in no small part by the centrifugal logics of European integration, culturally embedded identities 
continue to shape political identity in this small corner of Europe. After all Brexit is a touchstone for an 
ideological encounter residing at the very core of the discourse on the ‘European idea’ and its historic 
project from the outset.  On one side, are those for whom inalienable sovereignty is the first principle of 
politics, a reflex captured by the talismanic promise of Brexiteers promising to ‘take back control.’ On the 
other side, are those who discount the very idea of nation statehood as merely antediluvian politics. The 
question of the Irish border, indeed the entire Brexit imbroglio is but the latest episode and in microcosm 
of that enduring stand-off, Europe’s own ‘ancient quarrel’ about the very meaning and purposes of the 
national state. 
At the micro level of politics, protagonists on either side of this ideological fault-line over the 
‘meaning’ and prospects for ‘Europe’ nevertheless share an ethical responsibility to avoid outright 
catastrophe in this querulous region: to balance competing notions of self-interest against the risk of 
reviving sectarian divisions that threaten a still-tentative peace. Nothing less is at stake here than the 
reversal of history, rekindling anxieties that might propel a long-troubled land back to less happier times.  
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For many in Ireland, but also those international partners who were principal sponsors of the peace 
process, the prospect of reinstating a ‘hard’ border threatens that momentous achievement.  
Brexit has many negative consequences but none more potentially pernicious than opening the 
Pandora’s Box that is the Irish border.62 A point categorically made by Guy Verhofstadt, the European 
Parliament’s Brexit representative, when he asserted that Ireland “cannot become the collateral damage of 
Brexit.” 63 The onus is on the British Government to resolve the present uncertainty over future relations 
with its nearest neighbour. Only when London has stopped negotiating with itself, decided on its strategic 
preference amongst the competing options reviewed above and embarks on candid negotiations with 
Brussels will the border issue, indeed the United Kingdom’s future relations per se with the EU finally be 
resolved.  
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62 Monica McWilliams and Avila Kilmurray, We helped negotiate the Good Friday Agreement. We cannot allow Brexit to destroy 
it, New Statesman 7 March 2018.  
63 Speech in the European Parliament, cited in The Parliament Magazine, 13 December 2017. 
